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THE "PUBLIC PURPOSE" AND "CHARITABLE" TAX
EXEMPTION IN FLORIDA: A JUDICIAL
MORASS
All exemptions being in the nature of special privileges
or immunities, must be construed strictly in favor of the
Sovereign in order to confine such exemptions to the limitations prescribed by said Sovereign; otherwise the law-making
intent and the very purpose of government itself may be
frustrated to the detriment of the public welfare and the
common weal.
-Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718,
192 So. 211, 216 (1939)
Tax exemptions, and their often ruinous consequences, are as old
as the concept of taxation itself., Article IX, section 1, of the Florida
Constitution serves as the organic source of all ad valorem real property taxation within the state.2 The taxing power under article IX,
section 1, is inclusive of all real property in the state, but certain
enumerated exceptions are provided by the constitution and general
law. 3 The subject of concern here will be limited to exemptions
arising from three sources: (1) article IX, section 1, of the Florida
Constitution; (2) article XVI, section 16, of the Florida Constitution;
and (3) the general exemption statute enacted under article IX,
4
section 1.
Within this context primary emphasis will be placed
upon the "charitable" and "public purpose" exemptions.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Florida Constitution establishes two sources of real property
tax exemptions. 5 Article XVI, section 16, is a self-executing provision
applicable to "corporations."6 The section provides:
The property of all corporations, except the property of a corporation which shall construct a ship or barge canal across the
peninsula of Florida, if the Legislature should so enact, whether
heretofore or hereafter incorporated, shall be subject to taxation
1.

PALMER, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 162-63

(2d ed. 1956).

2. Miller v. Doss, 46 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. 1950).
3. Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718, 192 So. 211, 216 (1939);
Lummus v. Florida Adirondack School, Inc., 123 Fla. 810, 168 So. 232, 237 (1936);
Rast v. Hulvey, 77 Fla. 74, 80 So. 750, 753 (1919).
4. FLA. STAT. §192.06 (1965).
5. FLA. CONST. art. IX, §1; FLA. CONT. art XVI, §16.
6. Lummus v. Florida Adirondack School, Inc., 123 Fla. 810, 168 So. 232, 239
(1936).
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unless such property be held and used exclusively for religious,
scientific, municipal, educational, literary or charitable purposes.
The antecedents of article XVI, section 16 reach back to the Reconstruction Constitution of 1868.7 The section was amended in the
constitution of 1875.8 The principal change at that time was to make
the exemption dependent on the purpose for which corporate land
was actually used as opposed to the purpose for which the corporation
existed." A corporation using land for private profit could no longer
escape taxation on the ground that the organization was incorporated
for a tax exempt purpose. The present wording of the section first
appeared in the constitution of 1885.10
The second source of real property tax exemptions is found in
article IX, section 1.1 This is a non-self-executing provision 12 that
has been judicially described as comprehending "the whole law for
taxing real and personal property."' 3 This section dates back to the
Reconstruction Constitution. 4 Amendments were added in 192415
17
and 194418 bringing the section into its present form:
The Legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal rate
of taxation, except that it may provide for special rate or rates
on intangible property ....and shall prescribe such regulations
as shall secure a just valuation of all property, both real and
personal, excepting such property as may be exempted by law
for municipal, education, literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes.
7. FLA. CONST. art. XVI, §24 (1868): "The property of all corporations,
whether heretofore or hereafter incorporated, shall be subject to taxation, unless
such corporation be for religious, educational, or charitable purposes."
8. FLA. CONsT. art. XVI, §24 (1875): "The property of all corporations whether
heretofore or hereafter incorporated, shall be subject to taxation, unless such

property be held and used exclusively for religious, educational, or charitable
purposes." (Emphasis added.)
9. Lummus v. Florida Adirondack School, Inc., 123 Fla. 810, 168 So. 232, 239

(1936).
10. FLA. CONST. art. XVI, §16 (1885).
11. FLA. CONST. art. IX, §1.
12. Rast v. Hulvey, 77 Fla. 74, 80 So. 750, 752 (1919).
13. Miller v. Doss, 46 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. 1950).
14. FLA. CONST. art. XII, §1 (1868): "The Legislature shall provide for a
uniform and equal rate of taxation, and shall prescribe such regulations as shall
secure a just valuation of all property, both real and personal, excepting such
property as may be exempted by law for municipal, educational, literary, scientific,
religious, or charitable purposes."
15. Fla. Laws, S.J. Res. 358 (1923), adopted, (1924).
16. Fla. Laws, H.J. Res. 348 (1943), adopted, (1944).
17. FLA. CONST. art. IX, §1.
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Aside from its non-self-executing nature, article IX, section 1, is
distinguished from article XVI, section 16, in that (1) the provision
is not limited solely to corporations' s and (2) the land involved
need not be held exclusively for any of the purposes enumerated. 19
The relationship between these two distinguishing characteristics
raises a complicated array of constitutional questions. The basic
issues may be summarized as:
(1) Does article XVI, section 16, apply to all types of incorporated organizations whether private, nonprofit, or public in
nature?
(2) May a corporation obtain an exemption under article IX,
section 1, as well as under article XVI, section 16?
(3) If a corporation may obtain an exemption under article
IX, section 1, must this exemption be read in light of the "exclusive" use requirement of article XVI, section 16?
The answer to these queries does not come easily. It may be obtained
only by a careful reading of a line of cases involving the statutory
exemptions adopted under article IX, section 1.20
The "Charitable"and "Fraternal"Exemptions
The conflict between article IX, section 1, and article XVI, section
16, developed with the passage of chapter 18312 of the 1937 Florida
session laws. 21 Until that time the general exemption laws under
article IX, section 1, included the same "exclusive" use requirement
found in article XVI, section 16:22
The following property shall be exempt from taxation:

public property of the several counties, cities,
Second. -All
villages, towns and school districts in this State, used or intended for public purposes ....
Third. - Such property of educational, literary, benevolent,
charitable and scientific institutions within the State as shall
be actually occupied and used by them solely for the purposes
for which they have been or may be organized ....
18. State ex rel. Cragor Co. v. Doss, 150 Fla. 486, 8 So. 2d 15, 16 (1942).
19. Ibid.
20. FLA. STAT. §192.06 (2), (3) (1965).
21.

Fla. Laws, 1937, ch. 18312.

22. FLA. REV. GEN. STAT. §697 (1920), as amended,
§897 (1927). (Emphasis added.)
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Since the "sole use" standard of the third section of the statute was
interpreted to mean "exclusive use," 23 there was no need to distinguish between an unincorporated organization under article IX,
section 1, and a corporation under article XVI, section 16. The same
effect was achieved under the second part of the statute when the
Florida Supreme Court in City of Lakeland v. Amose 4 construed
"public purpose" as that land held in an exclusively governmental
capacity, as opposed to a proprietary capacity.2 5
In 1937 the third part of the general exemption law was substantially amended.2 6 The "sole use" requirement was abandoned
and the applicable institutions were permitted to rent as much as
fifty per cent of their property to private concerns without loss of
tax exempt status. The only limitation imposed was that the profits
derived from the rent had to be applied to the purpose for which the
institution was created. The rental percentage was amended to
seventy-five per cent in 193927 and has since remained at that figure.2 8
Once a different standard had been established under article IX,
section 1, it became necessary to define the scope of article XVI,
section 16. There was little doubt that article XVI, section 16,
applied to the private profitmaking corporation, 29 but did it also
apply to the nonprofit corporation? If it did, the nonprofit corporation would be required to meet the strict test of article XVI, section
16, while an identical nonprofit association would come under the
liberal test of article IX, section 1. The Florida Supreme Court
first reacted to the problem in State ex rel. Miller v. Doss.30 The case
arose as a mandamus proceeding questioning the validity of a tax
exemption granted to the Lake County Medical Center, a nonprofit
Florida corporation. Although the property involved met all the
statutory exemption requirements, 2 1 the court held that the exemp23. Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718, 192 So. 211, 217 (1939); Rast
v. Hulvey, 77 Fla. 74, 80 So. 750, 752 (1919).
24. 106 Fla. 873, 143 So. 744 (1932).
25. The holding is consistent with older Florida case law. See City of Bradentown v. State, 88 Fla. 381, 102 So. 556 (1924).
26. Fla. Laws, 1937, ch. 18312.
27. Fla. Laws, 1939, ch. 19376.
28. FLA. STAT. §192.06 (3) (1965).
29. Lummus v. Florida Adirondack School, Inc., 123 Fla. 810, 168 So. 232,

239 (1936).
30. 146 Fla. 752, 2 So. 2d 303 (1941).
31. "The record presents the following material facts: that the property involved is a four story building; it is owned by the Lake County Medical Center,
Inc., a corporation not for profit. The three upper floors are used exclusively
by the Medical Center for charitable purposes. The first floor contains places of
business rented to private persons. The rents are paid to the Medical Center and
are used exclusively to operate the hospital." State ex rel. Miller v. Doss, 146
Fla. 752, 2 So. 2d 303, 304 (1941).
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tion was invalid under article XVI, section 16. Part of the property
was rented to private concerns and thus not devoted "exclusively"
to charitable purposes. The plain implication of the holding was that
the term "all corporations" in article XVI, section 16, included both
profitmaking and nonprofit corporations.
Although the decision was logically consistent with the phraseology of article XVI, section 16, it soon led to inequitable results.
In State ex rel. Cragor Co. v. Doss 32 the court considered the validity
of tax exemptions granted to certain fraternal organizations. In
sustaining the exemptions the court employed the rationale of the
Miller case in reverse. "The record discloses that neither of the
owners of the properties are corporations as contemplated by Section
Sixteen of Article Sixteen of the Constitution so that provision has
no application to the question." 33 Instead, article IX, section 1, was
controlling and it was not necessary that the property be devoted
exclusively to fraternal purposes.
The effect of the Miller and Cragor holdings was to make the existence or nonexistence of tax exempt status rest on the label attached
to the organization. Although the presence of a profitmaking corporation might justify a difference in tax treatment,34 there is no reason
why a nonprofit incorporated medical center should be distinguished
for tax exemption purposes from a nonprofit unincorporated medical
center. 35 Tax consequences rest on the purpose that the organization
actually serves, not on the formalities of incorporation. 36 The court
itself recognized the inequities of the situation in a companion case
to Cragor, also styled State ex rel. Cragor Co. v. Doss.- In this case
the fraternal organizations were incorporated. They failed the test
of article XVI, section 16, in that a small percentage 38 of the property
32. 150 Fla. 486, 8 So. 2d 15 (1942).
33. State ex rel. Cragor Co. v. Doss, 150 Fla. 486, 8 So. 2d 15, 16 (1942).
34. There would ordinarily be a difference in the substance of the organization. Except for rare instances such as that which occurred in Lummus v. Florida
Adirondack School, Inc., 123 Fla. 810, 168 So. 232 (1936), the profitmaking corporation is not founded for charitable purposes.

35. Cf., Miller v. Doss, 46 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. 1950); Rogers v. City of
Leesburg, 157 Fla. 784, 27 So. 2d 70, 71 (1946).
36. Lummus v. Florida Adirondack School, Inc., 123 Fla. 810, 168 So. 232, 238
(1936); University Club v. Lanier, 119 Fla. 146, 161 So. 78, 79 (1935).
37. 150 Fla. 491, 8 So. 2d 17 (1942).
38. Two-thirds of the building owned by Leesburg Lodge No. 58 of the

F. & A.M. was rented to private concerns with revenues from the rent used to
retire the indebtedness on the property. The property of the Woman's Club of
Leesburg consisted of a two-story building. One-sixth of the first floor was rented

to the Works Progress Administration. The remainder of the first floor was
occupied, at no charge, by the Leesburg Public Library. The second floor was
rented out for private social affairs approximately five times per year. The rents
received were applied to the operational maintenance of the property.
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involved was rented to private business concerns. Relying completely
on extra-jurisdictional authority, 39 the court held: "[W]hen a property
is owned by a charitable association or corporation and part of it is
used for the purposes of the association and the balance used for
commercial or profit purposes, if severable that part used for the
purpose of the corporation . . . may be exempt from taxation while
that part used for profit may be taxed." 40
This approach did not, however, correct the basic inequity. Under
the statutory exemption a nonprofit unincorporated charitable organization renting less than seventy-five per cent of its property to
private concerns was still entitled to a greater tax exemption than an
identical incorporated charitable organization. The severing approach
was nonetheless a step toward the eventual abandonment of State ex
rel. Miller v. Doss. 41 Three years later in Rogers v. City of Leesburg42
the court once again faced the situation of an incorporated nonprofit
fraternal organization renting part of its property to private concem-s.
The court held that the property was totally exempt. The decision
was based on two grounds: (1) that article XVI, section 16, was never
intended to apply to nonprofit corporations and (2) that a tax exemption distinction between nonprofit corporations and unincorporated nonprofit organizations served no rational purpose.
The early decisions under article XVI, section 16, support the historical interpretation adopted in Rogers.43 During the pre-Civil War
era the state granted numerous tax exemptions to railroad corporations. 44 The exemptions had grown so pervasive that article XVI,
section 16, was included in the Reconstruction Constitution primarily
as a means of terminating what had become an intolerable situation. 45
Viewed in this light it seems reasonable to conclude that article XVI,
section 16, is basically unrelated to the nonprofit corporation. Following this line of reasoning, the court in Rogers concluded: 46

39. Y.M.C.A. v. Lancaster County, 106 Neb. 105, 182 N.W. 593 (1921); Hibernian Benevolent Soc'y v. Kelly, 28 Ore. 173, 42 Pac. 3 (1895); 2 CooLEY,
TAxATION

1442-44 (4th ed. 1924).

40. State ex rel. Cragor Co. v. Doss, 150 Fla. 491, 8 So. 2d 17, 18 (1942).
41. 146 Fla. 752, 2 So. 2d 303 (1941).
42. 157 Fla. 784, 27 So. 2d 70 (1946).
43. See Bloxham v. Florida Cent. & P.R.R., 35 Fla. 625, 17 So. 902 (1895);
Palmes v. Louisville & N. Ry., 19 Fla. 231 (1882); Atlantic & Gulf R.R. v. Allen,
15 Fla. 637 (1876).
44. See Bloxham v. Florida Cent. & P.R.R., 35 Fla. 625, 17 So. 902, 917
(1895); Internal Improvement Act of 1855, Fla. Laws, ch. 610 (1855-1856).
45. Lummus v. Florida Adirondack School, Inc., 123 Fla. 810, 168 So. 232,
239 (1936).
46. Rogers v. City of Leesburg, 157 Fla. 784, 27 So. 2d 70, 71 (1946).
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It is not the function of courts to be didactic, but it is their
function to square their judgments with reason .... [T]here is
not an instance in the history of this state when the Legislature
or the people have shown an intent to tax fraternal associations.
They have repeatedly shown a contrary purpose, and the mere
fact that these associations take a corporate name for the purpose of transacting their fraternal business does not deprive
them of their exemption granted by the Constitution.
Thus, the tax exemption status of the nonprofit corporation is to be
construed in light of article IX, section 1, not article XVI, section 16.
From a tax policy standpoint there is good reason for placing the
nonprofit corporation under article IX, section 1. To place it under
article XVI, section 16, amounts to a triumph of form over substance.
Nonetheless, if the nonprofit corporation is to gain an exemption under article IX, section 1, the exemption must fit within the confines
of that constitutional provision. Article IX, section 1, is an inclusive
taxing provision with certain enumerated exceptions. 48 To qualify
for one of these exceptions the land must be used for "municipal,
education, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes." The
court in Rogers held that a corporate label should not deprive an
organization of an exemption "granted by the Constitution." The
problem ignored by the court was that article IX, section 1, does not
permit exemptions for "fraternal" purposes. Although the general
exemption statute permits such exemptions, 4 9 it is an elementary
principle of constitutional law that a legislative enactment must conform to the limits imposed by a constitutional mandate.50 A non47. Following the Rogers decision the tax assessor removed the Lake County
Medical Center from the tax rolls. This was the same property that had been
held nonexempt in State ex rel. Miller v. Doss, 146 Fla. 752, 2 So. 2d 303 (1941).
The action of the tax assessor was once again challenged in a mandamus proceeding. The facts had not been changed; even the petitioning taxpayer was the
same as in the earlier case. The court in Miller v. Doss, 46 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1950),
held that the property was exempt on the basis of its decision in Rogers. Since the
facts in Miller v. Doss were identical with those in State ex rel. Miller v. Doss,
there can be no doubt that the latter case has been abandoned by the court.
48. See cases cited note 3 supra.
49. FLA. STAT. §192.06(3) (1965): "Such property of educational, literary,
benevolent, fraternal, charitable and scientific institutions within this state ......
(Emphasis added.)
50. This proposition was expressly recognized and applied to Florida tax exemptions in Lummus v. Florida Adirondack School, Inc., 123 Fla. 810, 168 So. 232,
239 (1936): "[T]he Legislature may by enactments not inconsistent with the intendments of the Constitution define 'educational purposes,' and thereby prescribe
that class of property which may come within the exemption . . . . Or, the
Legislature may . . . leave it to judicial construction to determine whether or
not the purpose for which the property is held and used is an 'educational
purpose.,

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1966

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1966], Art. 6
1966]

NOTES

profit charitable corporation falls within article IX, section 1, but a
nonprofit fraternal corporation has no such constitutional position.
Whereas a distinction based on corporate labels serves no useful
tax function in this context, the distinction between a "fraternal" and
a "charitable" organization is a matter of substance. The charity performs a valuable service for society in relieving the demands that
would otherwise be placed on state welfare agencies. 51 The fraternal
organization, on the other hand, is primarily a social or recreational
organization. 52 Although many of these organizations also perform
charitable services, 53 the statute does not make this a requirement
for their tax exempt status. The standard invoked by the constitution is a "charitable" purpose, and it would seem that unless the
fraternal organization can meet the requirements of a charity there is
no constitutional or policy justification for granting it tax exempt
status.54
The "PublicPurpose" Exemption
The "public purpose" exemption dates back to the post-World War
I era.55 The wording of the statute has remained essentially un"We do not mean to say that the power vested in the Legislature to define
property included within the exemption prescribed by the Constitution may be
exercised in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner. Such Legislative definition
would have to be in harmony with the intent of the Constitution."
In relation to this constitutional principle the court has also expressly stated:
"Undoubtedly the Legislature is without power to provide for exempting from
taxation any class of property which the Constitution itself makes no provision
for exempting. The principle has been more than once affirmed in this state that
the Constitution must be construed as a limitation upon the power of the Legislature to pxovide for the exemption from taxation of any classes of property except
those particularly mentioned classes specified in the organic law itself." L. Maxcy,
Inc. v. Federal Land Bank, 111 Fla. 116, 150 So. 248, 250 (1933).
51. Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718, 192 So. 211, 217 (1939),
quoting Congregational Sunday School & Pub. Soc'y v. Board of Review, 290 Ill. 108,
125 N.E. 7, 10 (1919): "'The fundamental ground upon which all exemptions
in favor of charitable institutions are based is the benefit conferred upon the
public by them, and the consequent relief, to some extent of the burden upon
the state to care for and advance the interests of its citizens.'"
52. See University Club v. Lanier, 119 Fla. 146, 161 So. 78 (1935); Johnson v.
Sparkman, 159 Fla. 276, 31 So. 2d 863 (1947). This is not meant to imply that
such organizations have no eleemosynary purposes. The point is that fraternalism
standing alone, does not confer the benefits on the state which justify an exemption for charitable institutions.
53. The children's hospitals maintained by the "Shrine" are a case in point.
54. See Moffett v. Ashby, 139 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1962); Johnson v. Sparkman, 159
Fla. 276, 31 So. 2d 863 (1947); Simpson v. Bohon, 159 Fla. 280, 31 So. 2d 406
(1947); University Club v. Lanier, 119 Fla. 146, 161 So. 78 (1935).
55. FLA. REv. GmN. STAT. §697 (1920): "The following property shall be
exempt from taxation. . . .Second. All public property of the several counties,
cities, villages, towns and school districts in this State, used or intended for
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changed.56 The statute establishes two requirements for an exemption:
(1) that the land be owned by a municipal corporation and (2) that
the land be used for a public function or purpose.5 7 The statute does
not require that the public function be actually performed by the
municipality. A private profitmaking corporation may lease the land
and maintain the public function without loss of the tax exemption. 58
Further, there is no express requirement that the land be devoted
exclusively to a public purpose.
The early decisions were not inclined to adopt a liberal interpretation of this statute.5 9 In City of Lakeland v. Amos

60

the municipality

questioned the validity of a state tax imposed on profits received
from the operation of a public utility system. The court held that a
municipal corporation fell within the mandate of article XVI, section
16, and that its property was not exempt unless held in an exclusively
governmental capacity. Since the operation of a public utility was
proprietary, not governmental in nature, there could be no tax exemption.
The strict interpretation of this exemption continued until the
early 1940's.61 Unfortunately such consistency did not prevail. In
1939 the legislature authorized the city of Tallahassee to issue bonds
for the purpose of constructing an office building. 62 The building
was to be rented to federal, state, and county governmental agencies
63
for profit. In State v. City of Tallahassee
the validity of the bonds

was questioned on the ground that they were not issued for a "public
purpose." The court, relying primarily on non-Florida case law,64
public purposes ......
56. FLA. STAT. § 192.06 (2) (1965).
57. In this context it is important to note that the courts have used the constitutional term "municipal purpose" and the statutory term "public purpose"

as functional equivalents. See State v. City of Tallahassee, 142 Fla. 476, 195 So.
402 (1940); City of Lakeland v. Amos, 106 Fla. 873, 143 So. 744 (1932); City of
Bradentown v. State, 88 Fla. 381, 102 So. 556 (1924).
58. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist. v. Paul, 179 So.
2d 349 (Fla. 1965); see Comment, 18 U. FLA. L. REv. 708 (1966).
59. See City of Bradentown v. State, 88 Fla. 381, 102 So. 556 (1924); State v.
Town of Belleair, 125 Fla. 669, 170 So. 434 (1936).
60. 106 Fla. 873, 143 So. 744 (1932).
61. City of St. Augustine v. Middleton, 147 Fla. 529, 3 So. 2d 153 (1941);
Panama City v. Pledger, 140 Fla. 629, 192 So. 470 (1940); State v. Town of
Belleair, 125 Fla. 669, 170 So. 434 (1936).
62. Florida Spec. Acts, 1939, ch. 20158.
63. 142 Fla. 476, 195 So. 402 (1940).
64.

City of Sacramento v. Adams, 171 Cal. 458, 153 Pac. 908 (1915); State v.

City of Lawrence, 78 Kan. 234, 100 Pac. 485 (1909); Merrick v. Amherst, 12 Allen
(94 Mass.) 500 (1866); State ex rel. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Clausen, 95 Wash. 214, 163
Pac. 744 (1917). The only Florida case cited by the court was State ex rel. Gibbs

v. Gordon, 138 Fla. 312, 189 So. 437 (1939).
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held that the construction and operation of an office building for rent
to other governmental agencies was a valid municipal purpose. The
decision is important in two respects: (1) it represented a clear departure from the strict interpretation of public purpose and (2) it
indicated that more substantial departures were to follow. Hidden
within the body of the majority opinion, the court states: "The
answer to what is a municipal purpose is not static. Each generation
may determine its concept of these things." 65
Following State v. City of Tallahassee66 the judicial interpretation
of public purpose entered into a period of liberalization.67 While
the public purpose concept underwent. considerable expansion, the
exclusive use requirement of article XVI, section 16, was increasingly
ignored.68 Even under the strict interpretation of the 1930's the
court had recognized that a corporation was not prevented from obtaining an article XVI, section 16, exemption merely because it was
operated for profit.69 The profit, however, had to be "incidental" to
the religious, scientific, municipal, educational, literary, or charitable
purpose of the corporation.
Lummus v. Florida-AdirondackSchool, Inc.70 was the first case to
develop fully the "incidental profit" rationale. The corporation involved was an educational institution the profits of which were devoted solely to the living expenses of the owners and operators of the
school. In determining that the profits were incidental the court did
not adopt an express test to serve as a guideline for the resolution of
this issue. Instead, future courts were permitted to exercise their
judgment on the question according to the facts of each particular
case. The effect was to open the door to a wholesale dilution of the
exclusive use requirement of article XVI, section 16. By 1956 the
private operation of an automobile raceway on public land was adjudged to create sufficient community-wide economic benefits that the
71
corporate profit received was incidental to this public purpose.

65. State v. City of Tallahassee, 142 Fla. 476, 195 So. 402, 403 (1940).
66. 142 Fla. 476, 195 So. 402 (1940).
67. See State v. Inter-American Center Authority, 84 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1955);
Seaboard Airline R.R. v. Peters, 43 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1949). For a complete discussion of the interpretation given to public purpose see text following the subheading TBE PUBLIC PURPOSE EXEMPTION: A CONCEPTUAL DILEMMA, infra.
68. See State v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist., 89 So.
2d 34 (Fla. 1956). A complete discussion of this area will be found under the
subheading THE PUBLIC PURPOSE EXEMPTION: A CONCEPTUAL DILEMMA, infra.
69. See Lummus v. Florida Adirondack School, Inc., 123 Fla. 810, 168 So. 232
(1936).
70. Ibid.
71. State v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational 'Facilities Dist., 89 So. 2d
34 (Fla. 1956).
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THE RESULT

There are four assets on which a state may base its tax revenue:
property, personal income, sales, and excises7 2 State taxation in
Florida rests largely on sales and excise assets, while local taxation
is primarily property oriented.73 What is the effect of tax exemptions
on local tax assets? In 1961, Arthur L. Cunkle, an economist with
the Florida Legislative Reference Service, illustrated the difficulties
74
in attempting to answer this query:
We do not know the amount of taxes paid by homeowners,
though the total is very large. We do not know the amount
of taxes or exemptions in Florida cities, though both are large.
We do not know the size of inventory taxes, though there are
perennial attempts to exempt inventories. We do not know
how vacant lots, farms, forests, subdivisions, personal property
and hotels are assessed, though we know there are as many
answers as there are assessors. We do not know how much
property other than homes is exempt from taxation, or for
what purposes.
Although many problems still remain unsolved, the present situation
is not as dismal as the one that faced Mr. Cunkle in 1961.
The 1965 tax assessment rolls indicate that the assessed value of
all nonexempt real property in Florida amounts to 17,036,887,343
dollars75 The total value of all exempt real property, excluding
the homestead allotment, is 3,901,172,696 dollars.7 Thus in Florida
for every $4/4 billion worth of taxable property there is approximately
$1 billion worth of exempt nonhomestead property. The effect is
that the local tax basis, on the average, is reduced by approximately
77
twenty per cent.
A random sampling from some of the more populous counties indicates the following relationship between exempt and nonexempt
78
real property:

72.
73.
74.
75.
by the
76.

SLY, TAX ASSETS AND TAX POLICIES IN FLORIDA 1 (1964).

Id., at 9-13.
Id., at iv.
Analysis by County of the 1965 Ad Valorem Tax Rolls (compiled annually
Office of the State Comptroller [Fla.] and available on request).
Ibid.

77. This figure is determined by adding the worth of nonexempt property to
the worth of exempt property and then computing the percentage exempted
from the total potential tax base.
78. Analysis by County of the 1965 Ad Valorem Tax Rolls.
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Assessed Value
Nonexempt Real
Property
Broward County
Dade County
Duval County
Escambia County
Hillsborough County
Pinellas County
Polk County
Sarasota County

$1,569,592,288
4,565,223,715
1,295,374,600
206,993,270
474,114,857
1,256,448,370
574,698,280
261,215,780

Valuation of
Land Wholly
Exempt

$

38,788,948
1,135,325,190
321,702,560
24,897,540
192,600,430
177,639,780
120,889,319
14,074,940

Because of peculiar local conditions some counties have as much as
fifty per cent of their taxable basis exempted. Alachua County, with
the University of Florida and the state medical center, has 243,424,570
dollars worth of nonexempt real estate as compared with 244,310,625
dollars worth of exempted property.79 Brevard County, with the
federal facilities at Cape Kennedy, has 474,910,005 dollars worth of
nonexempt property and 976,928,970 dollars worth of wholly exempted
property. 89
The statewide trend during the past four years has been toward
an increased valuation in both categories of property. 81

1962
1963
1964
1965

Assessed Value
Real Estate
Nonexempt

Ratio - Per cent

$10,058,594,667
10,447,314,575
13,831,811,107
17,036,887,343

10.0:1.6
10.4:1.7
13.8:2.3
17.0:3.9

(16.0%)
(16.3%)
(16.6%)
(22.9%)

Valuation
of Land
Wholly Exempt
$1,605,933,340
1,718,789,950
2,345,958,830
3,901,172,696

Although there is no means of determining how much of this increase
in value is to be attributed to reassessment or natural appreciation, it
is significant to note that the percentage base has steadily increased
over the four-year period. Regardless of the source of this increase,
the effect is that the exempted percentage of the tax base has shown
a steady pattern of growth in relation to the taxable base.
It is a matter of common knowledge that modem society has
placed ever increasing demands on local, state, and federal govern79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. These figures are taken from the Analysis by County of the 1965 Ad
Valorem Tax Rolls and similar reports for the years 1962, 1963, and 1964.
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ment. 82 If these demands are to be met, they must be financed from
the only source of income available to government - taxation. The
state legislature 8 3 and several independent study groups84 have already recommended a thorough reexamination of all facets of state
and local tax policy. An excellent starting point from both a legislative and judicial frame of reference would be the loosely worded
and loosely interpreted tax exemptions granted under the Florida
Statutes. 85
THE CHARITABLE ExEMPTION: PROFITABLE ALTRUISM

Article IX, section 1, as interpreted, and its enacting statute provide for an exemption to nonprofit corporations that serve a charitable
purpose. The rationale behind this exemption was expressed in
Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus 6 when the Florida Supreme Court,
quoting from an Illinois case,8 7 stated: " '[T]he fundamental ground
on which all exemptions in favor of charitable institutions are based
is the benefit conferred upon the public by them, and the consequent
relief, to some extent of the burden upon the state to care for and
advance the interest of its citizens.' "
There is little doubt that an institution that confers a substantial
charitable benefit upon the state may be entitled to a favorable tax
treatment. 88 It is equally clear that an institution that confers only
an incidental benefit upon the state is not intended to be within the
exempting statute. 89 For example, a manufacturing corporation may
serve the interests of the state by reducing unemployment.' ° Yet all
such corporations are not entitled to preferential tax treatment. Beyond this level, however, the Miami Battlecreek decision does not
82. SLY, op. cit. supra note 72, at 30-31: "Florida is a rapidly growing state.
It is almost an 'exploding state.' With a predicted population of 8 million in 1970,
there will be more pressures for services and more pressures for revenues ....
"
83. See Report and Recommendations of the Joint Legislative Interim Committee on Finance and Taxation [Fla.] (1959-1961).
84. See Report and Recommendations of the Florida Citizens Tax Council
(March 1957);

KILPATRICK,

FINANCING

STATE AND

LOCAL

GOVERNMENTS

IN

FLORIDA

(1957).
85. FLA. STAT. §192.06 (1965).
86. 140 Fla. 718, 192 So. 211, 217 (1939).
87. Congregational Sunday School & Pub. Soc'y v. Board of Review, 290 Il.
108, 125 N.E. 7, 10 (1919).
88. See, e.g., Hungerford Convalescent Hosp. Ass'n v. Osborn, 150 So. 2d 230
(Fla. 1963); Orange County v. Orlando Osteopathic Hosp. Inc., 66 So. 2d 285
(Fla. 1953); Miller v. Doss, 46 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1950); Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus,
140 Fla. 718, 192 So. 211 (1939).
89. State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d 779, 784-85 (Fla. 1952).
90. Ibid.
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attempt to define the conceptual source of the exemption - that is, the
term "charitable." The rationale of the case is more a justification for
charitable exemptions than a test to determine what types of corporations are comprehended by the statute.
92
9
The language of the Florida Constitution ' and the statute
gives no insight into the meaning and scope of the charitable exemption. The burden has fallen upon the courts to construe the
provisions and to define and limit those types of corporations that
fall within the term. 93 Defining "charitable" has proved to be no
easy task. The character and functions of charitable corporations
are almost as varied as the number of such corporations.94 Furthermore, the distinction between a charitable corporation and a noncharitable corporation is often hard to detect. It would be extremely
difficult to devise a precise test that would be broad enough to encompass all charitable corporations and yet exclude noncharitable
or quasi-charitable corporations.
The Florida courts have not formulated any comprehensive definition of charitable. Instead, the courts have examined the character,
function, and purpose of each institution claiming a charitable exemption and then determined on such evidence whether the institution
came within the confines of the statute. 95 Thus, the test has been an
individual one for each particular corporation. 6 An individual test
may reach the most equitable results in a particular case, but such a
test does not offer persuasive standards for determining whether other
corporations should or should not be granted exemptions. The result is confusion and uncertainty over what constitutes a charitable
corporation in Florida91
Further complicating a determination of the standards imposed
upon charitable corporations is the fact that all the reported cases
have been concerned with the effect of an operational gain on the
charitable status of the corporation, as well as the basic characterof

91.
92.
93.

FLA. CONST. art. IX, §1.
FLA. STAT. §192.06 (3) (1965).
Lummus v. Florida Adirondack School, Inc., 123 Fla. 810, 168 So. 232,

239 (1936).
94. Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, Inc., 173 So. 2d 176, 180 (2d
D.CA. Fla. 1965).
95. See, e.g., Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, Inc., 173 So. 2d
176 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965); Hungerford Convalescent Hosp. Ass'n v. Osborn, 150
So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1965); Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718, 192 So. 211
(1939).
96. Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, Inc., supra note 95, at 181.
97. Compare Presbyterian Homes of the Synod of Florida, Inc. v. City of
Bradenton, Case No. 34,232, Fla. Sup. Ct., Oct. 5, 1966, with Fellowship Foundation
v. Paul, 86 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1956).
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the property itself.9s It should be noted that these are two distinct
issues. 99 The charitable exemption is given to the corporation on the
basis of how it uses the land. The use of the operational gain does not
necessarily classify a corporation as charitable. The use of the profits
is not the same thing as the use of the land. Nonetheless, the use of
profits may serve as a guideline in determining whether such use is
inconsistent with the charitable purpose of the property?00 The
courts, however, have not made a clear distinction in this area.' 0 1
Effect of OperationalGain
A discussion of the effect of an operational gain on the charitable
corporation presupposes that the corporation is of a charitable nature.
For the purposes of this discussion, therefore, the charitable nature
of any corporation will be assumed with discussion being limited
to the effect of an operational gain on this charitable nature.
In Lummus v. Florida-Adirondack School, Inc., the first case to
concern the effect of operational gain, the Florida Supreme Court
stated: "The earning of a livelihood or even a mere incidental surplus, if any, would not be deemed to effect a change in the purpose
for which the private property was held and used by the individual
or organization.' ' 1 2 The court held that an educational institute
could charge the recipients for its services and not lose its exempt
status. The principle was adhered to and expanded considerably by
the courts in later cases involving charitable corporations.103 In
Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus 1 0 4 a private hospital brought an action
to restrain the tax collector of Dade County from assessing its
property. In 1936, the hospital derived a total of 170,613.65 dollars
from paying patients and expended 39,381.97 dollars on charity cases.
98. See Presbyterian Homes of the Synod of Fla., Inc. v.City of Bradenton,
note 97 supra; Maxwell v. Good Samaritan Hosp. Ass'n, 161 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 1964);
Hungerford Convalescent Hosp. Ass'n v. Osborn, 150 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1963); Fellowship Foundation, Inc. v. Paul, note 97 supra; Orange County v. Orlando Osteopathic
Hosp., 66 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1953); Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718, 192
So. 211 (1939); Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, Inc., 173 So. 2d 176 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
99. Johnson v.Sparkman, 159 Fla. 276, 31 So. 2d 863, 864 (1947). For a comparison of this case with those in other jurisdictions see Annot., 34 A.L.R. 634,
659 (1925) and Annot., 172 A.L.R. 1067 (1948).
100. Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718, 192 So. 211, 218 (1939).
101. See, e.g., Hungerford Convalescent Hosp. Ass'n v. Osborn, 150 So. 2d
230 (Fla. 1963); Orange County v. Orlando Osteopathic Hosp. Inc., 66 So. 2d 285
(Fla. 1953).
102. 123 Fla. 819, 168 So. 232, 240 (1936).
103. See Orange County v. Orlando Osteopathic Hosp. Inc., 66 So. 2d 285, 288
(Fla. 1953); Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718, 192 So. 211, 218 (1939).
104. 140 Fla. 718, 192 So. 211 (1939).
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There was a substantial operational gain realized during the year.
The profits were reinvested in the corporation for expansion and
modernization of its facilities. In upholding the tax exempt status
of the corporation, the court held that profits do not alter the character of a charitable institution provided such funds are "devoted exclusively and in good faith to the charitable . . .purposes of the
institution."105 The court went on to say that such practices as payment of dividends to stockholders or exorbitant and unreasonable
salaries to the officers "would prevent the institution from being
exempt from taxation. ' 1o6
In Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, Inc.,10 the Second
District Court of Appeal held that exorbitant profits, accumulated in
order to cover the expense of persons in the retirement home who
subsequently became unable to pay, were not sufficient justification
to prevent the charitable status from expiring. The case is confusing,
however, because the court did not make a clear distinction between
the uses of an operational gain and the basic character of the property itself. It is not certain whether the manner in which the profit
was used altered the charitable status of the corporation or if the
operational gain was one of the factors used to determine whether the
property was not devoted to a charitable purpose.
The case is important, however, because it may mark the first
time that a Florida court has considered the proposition that a high
operational gain is itself inconsistent with the charitable exemption.
Consider for example, the following hypothetical situation: X Corporation, a private clinic, treats twenty per cent charity patients and
eighty per cent paying patients. In one year the corporation realized
a profit of 100,000 dollars, which is reinvested in the corporation.
Under Miami-Battlecreek, the corporation would remain tax exempt
because its profits were used consistent with the charitable purpose.
Under Haines, however, it is arguable that the profits per se showed
that the corporation was not using the land as a charity within the
meaning of the constitution and statutes. Such an argument would
be predicated upon the idea that there is a basic inconsistency between
a charitable corporation and one that realizes substantial profits regardless of the use that is made of those profits.
Although the Haines court did not expressly state that exorbitant
profits were inconsistent with "charity," the case implies such a result.
Nonetheless, with the exception of the implication in Haines, the
Florida Supreme Court's position on the effect of an operational gain
may be summarized as:
105.

140 Fla. 718, id. at 218.

106. Ibid.

107. 173 So. 2d 176 (2d D.C.A. Fla.), cert. denied, 183 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1965).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol19/iss2/6

16

Goddard and Spencer: The "Public Purpose" and "Charitable" Tax Exemption in Florida: A
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XlX

(1) a charitable corporation may charge its recipients who are
able to pay and not lose its charitable status, and
(2) a charitable corporation may have a substantial operational
gain and not lose its charitable exemption provided such profits
are used consistent with the charitable purposes of the corporation.
The Characterof a CharitableCorporationin Florida
No effort has been made to define a charitable corporation as it
exists under Florida law. The discussion has been limited to the
uses of an operational profit that will cause the charitable status to
expire. As previously stated, the courts have not devised a precise
test to determine whether a corporation is or is not, in fact, a
charity.10 8 Instead, the courts have recited the facts surrounding the
function and purpose of the corporation and declared on the basis
of those facts that the corporation was or was not entitled to a tax
exemption.1° 9 The situation is further complicated in that the courts
often neglect to state the specific facts on which the decision is
based 1 0° Thus to a large extent, what does or does not constitute a
charitable corporation is limited to the factual situations presented
by the cases decided by lower appellate courts. The charitable
exemption cases in Florida can, however, be divided into essentially
two categories- (1) factual situations involving retirement homes,",
and (2) factual situations involving hospitals or clinics. 1 2 Although
it is not clear why the courts should differentiate between the two
types of corporations, "1 3 it appears that markedly different results
have been reached depending more on whether the corporation was
a hospital or retirement home than on the amount of charitable work
actually done.11
108. See cases cited note 98 supra.
109. Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, Inc., 173 So. 2d 176, 180-81 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
110. Hungerford Convalescent Hosp. Ass'n v. Osborn, 150 So. 2d 230, 231 (Fla.

1963).
111. Presbyterian Homes of the Synod of Florida, Inc. v. City of Bradenton,
Case No. 34,232, Fla. Sup. Ct., Oct. 5, 1966; Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist
Home, Inc., 173 So. 2d 176 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965); Fellowship Foundation v. Paul,
86 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1956).
112. See Orange County v. Orlando Osteopathic Hosp. Inc., 66 So. 2d 285
(Fla. 1953); Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718, 192 So. 211 (1939).
113. See Justice Robert's dissent in Presbyterian Homes of the Synod of Florida,
Inc. v. City of Bradenton, Case No. 34,232, Fla. Sup. Ct., Oct. 5, 1966.
114. Compare Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718, 192 So. 211, 214
(1939) (charitable hospital with operation gain of $141,221.62), with Presbyterian
Homes of the Synod of Fla., Inc. v. City of Bradenton, note 113 supra (charitable
retirement home with no operational gain).
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Retirement Homes. In Fellowship Foundation, Inc. v. Paul"15 the
corporation operated a home for elderly Christian people. Its purpose
was to carry on educational, religious, and charitable activities. The
chancellor found that leases for rooms ran as high as 10,500 dollars
for the life of the patient. The facts disclosed that every room in the
home was being paid for by the patients and that the home had
never treated a nonpaying patient. On these facts the trial court dismissed the claim of the foundation and refused to enjoin the tax
assessor from placing the property on the tax rolls. On appeal, the
Florida Supreme Court remanded on the ground that the record did
not conclusively show that the foundation was not charitable. The
court did not, however, indicate any guidelines for the trial court to
follow in making a new determination as to whether the foundation
was charitable. For example, could the lower court grant an exemption to the foundation if there were a single charity case? Or was it
necessary for the foundation to devote a substantial amount of its
facilities to charitable work before it could qualify for a favorable tax
treatment?
A recent decision indicates that a retirement home must provide
more than a nominal amount of charity work to qualify for the
exemption. In Presbyterian Homes of the Synod of Florida, Inc. v.
City of Bradenton"6 the Florida Supreme Court affirmed a lower court
decision holding that a retirement home was not exempt when only
twenty-three of some 126 patients paid less than the average monthly
maintenance cost. The facts of the case also disclosed that each patient
was required to pay a "founder's fee" of 5,000 dollars before entering
the hospital. The court, however, did not state whether it based the
decision on the fact that there were so few nonpaying patients or
that the founder's fee negated any inference of a charitable purpose.
Further complicating the decision is that the case was ostensibly decided under article XVI, section 16, of the Florida Constitution, not
under article IX, section 1. Since'article IX, section 1, does not have
an "exclusive use" requirement, the question remains open whether
the corporation would have been granted an exemption if it had
brought its action under this constitutional provision.
PresbyterianHomes and Fellowship Foundation are the only two
cases concerning charitable exemptions for retirement homes that
have been entertained by the supreme court. In Fellowship Foundation the court reversed and remanded the case to the lower court to
determine if the home was a charity, without offering any guidelines
to assist the lower court in its determination. The Presbyterian
Homes case was a per curiam decision merely asserting the facts and
115.
116.

86 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1956).
Case No. 34,232, Fla. Sup. Ct., Oct. 5, 1966.
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affirming on the basis of the lower court opinion. The only reasoned
opinion in this area is by the Second District Court of Appeal in
Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, Inc.""
In a well-written opinion, the Haines court classified the home as
a "profitable business" and refused to grant an exemption. Citing
an Oregon case, 1 8 the court based its decision on a consideration of
the following factors:
(1) the application or use of the corporate income;
(2) a comparison between the treatment given to paying patients and that given to nonpaying patients;
(3) whether the corporation treated paying and nonpaying
patients;
(4) a comparison of the fees collected from paying and indigent
patients;
(5) whether a charitable trust fund had been created by the
corporation;
(6) if the corporation had no operation gain, whether there
were offsetting advantages that compensated for the lack of profit;
and
(7) the provisions made in the bylaws as to the distribution
of assets in the event of corporate dissolution.
After an analysis of these factors the court stated:"

9

We thus conclude that the plaintiff, though altruistically motivated and serving a socially constructive purpose, is nevertheless a financially viable institution whose property is not entitled to exemption from taxation.
Though the court did not elaborate on the full significance of all
the factors brought forward, the decision nonetheless presents a possible test for resolving the factual question of what is a charity. By
doing so the court has come to the essence of the problem in this
area, and the solution offered, although perhaps not perfect, is better
than the ad hoc undefined approach applied by the Florida Supreme
Court.
Hospitals. In the area of charitable hospitals the ad hoc approach
of the supreme court is applied with abandon. Since the court has
determined the tax status of hospitals in Florida on the basis of the
particular facts of each case, the holdings are thus limited to those
117. 173 So. 2d 176 (2d D.C.A. Fla.), cert. denied, 183 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1965).
118. Oregon Methodist Homes, Inc. v. Horn, 226 Ore. 298, 360 P.2d 293 (1960).
119. Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, Inc., 173 So. 2d 176, 185 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1965).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1966

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1966], Art. 6
1966]

NOTES

facts. Nothing would be gained by an elaborate recitation of the
facts presented in each case. Suffice it to say that the supreme court
has granted exemptions to:, (1) a corporation that expended 39,391.97
dollars on charity cases and collected 170,613.65 dollars from its
paying patients, 120 (2) a corporation that averaged 34 19/100 per cent
of its net revenues from supposedly "charity cases,' 12 1 and (3) a corporation that had a per patient income in excess of per patient cost.

22

In each of these cases the corporations involved were profitmaking
in nature. They escaped taxation by reinvesting the profits in the
corporation. But, if the use of the land was not charitable, it is
difficult to see why the mere act of reinvestment prevented taxation.
If operational gain destroys the charitable nature of the property, the
profits are not being reinvested into a charitable pursuit -they are
in substance being reinvested into income producing capital.
Some confusion and uncertainty exists over what constitutes a
charitable corporation in Florida. Consequently it is difficult to de-termine whether Florida has adopted tax policies that serve the best
interest of the state. It is beyond the scope of this note to evaluate
the relative merits of a restrictive as opposed to a liberal charitable
exemption policy. One area of the tax policy, however, warrants
further consideration -granting charitable exemptions to corporations that realize substantial profits. Under Florida law viable and
lucrative businesses can receive a charitable exemption., 2

These

businesses, of course, do provide charity work that is a benefit to
the state. The issue, however, is whether the interests of the citizens
of the state are advanced more by allowing lucrative businesses a
charitable exemption than by assessing their property and using the
revenue to finance state services. Charitable exemptions are special
favors by the state and should be limited to institutions that are
organized primarily for a charitable purpose. Such exemptions should
not be extended to profitable corporations even if they provide charity
incident to their operation. 24 The charitable exemption should
serve as incentive and assistance to true charities and not as extra
income to thriving enterprises.

120.
121.

Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718, 192 So. 211 (1939).
Orange County v. Orlando Osteopathic Hosp. Inc., 66 So. 2d 285 (Fla.

1953).
122. Hungerford Convalescent Hosp. Ass'n v. Osborn, 150 So. 2d 230 (Fla.
1963) (by implication).
123. See Orange County v. Orlando Osteopathic Hosp. Inc., 66 So. 2d 285
(Fla. 1953); Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718, 192 So. 211 (1939).
124. See generally Annot., 34 A.L.R. 634, 626 (1925).
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CONCEPTUAL DILEMMA

The "public purpose" concept has wide application in both
state and municipal law. The concept serves as a condition precedent
to governmental action in three areas:
(1) private property may not be taken by eminent domain
12
unless the taking is for a valid public purpose;
(2) the credit of the state may not be pledged, nor governmental funds appropriated, for other than a public purpose; 126 and
(3) the property of a municipality is subject to taxation unless
12
held for a public purpose.

7

The varied application of the term illustrates its conceptual nature.
As such, the interpretation given it will vary according to the social
context and environmental predisposition of the court. 2
In the tax exemptions area both article IX, section 1, and article
XVI, section 16, grant exemptions to land held and used for "municipal purposes." The general exemption laws under article IX,
section 1, grant exemptions to land held and used for a "public
purpose.' ' 1 29 The courts have ignored this phraseological distinction,
interpreting "municipal" purpose and "public" purposes as functional
equivalents. a0 Further, by restricting the scope of the statutory public
purpose exemption to land held and used in an exclusively governmental or municipal capacity, 31 the courts have in effect removed
the basic distinction between article IX, section 1, and article XIV,
section 16.132
A public purpose may, of course, benefit both public and private
interests. 33 The presence of some private benefit will not contami134
nate the public purpose'as long as the private benefit is "incidental."
125.

FLA. CONST. art. XVI, §29.

126. FLA. CONST. art. IX, §§5, 10.
127. FLA. CONST. art. IX, §1; FLA. STAT. §192.06 (2) (1965).
128. State v. City of Tallahassee, 142 Fla. 476, 195 So. 402, 403 (1940).
129. FLA. STAT. §192.06 (2) (1965).
130. See cases cited note 57 supra.
131. See State ex rel. Burbridge v. St. John, 143 Fla. 544, 197 So. 131, 133
(1940); City of Lakeland v. Amos, 106 Fla. 873, 143 So. 74-t, 747 (1932); City of
Bradentown v. State, 88 Fla. 381, 102 So. 556, 558 (1924).
132. It will be recalled that article XVI, §16, bases its exemption on an "exclusive" municipal purpose, while article IX, §1, contains no "exclusive" requirement.
133. Gate City Garage, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 66 So. 2d 653, 659 (Fla.
1953): quoting 18 AM. JuR. Eminent Domain §41 (1938): "'The general rule is
settled that the exercise of eminent domain for a public purpose which is primary
and paramount will not be defeated by the fact that incidentally a private use or
benefit will result which will not itself warrant the exercise of the power.",
134. Ibid.
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The difficulty is that the term "incidental," like the term "public
purpose," is subject to varying and often conflicting interpretations
according to the viewpoint of the court at a particular time. The
treatment accorded these terms by the Florida Supreme Court
illustrates some of the conceptual difficulties involved.
"PublicPurpose"
The Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of public purpose was
once so restrictive as to regard the operation of a public utilities
135
system as essentially proprietary, not governmental, in character.
In the 1940's, however, a more expansive concept began to appear.13 6
In State ex rel. Harper v. McDavid137 the court held that the operation of a low rent housing project on public land was a valid municipal purpose entitling the property to a tax exemption. In discussing
public purpose the court stated: "The time was when a municipal
purpose was restricted to police protection or such enterprises as
were strictly governmental but that concept has been very much
expanded and a municipal purpose may not comprehend all activities essential to the health, morals, protections, and welfare of the
municipality."38
The housing project in Harperwas authorized by act of the state
legislature. 39 The act conferred tax exempt status on the land by
virtue of a legislative declaration that the property was held and
used for a municipal purpose. In construing the declaration the court
held that the legislative definition of public purpose would be accepted as binding unless it constituted a clear abuse of discretion.
The declaration was upheld in that (1) the land was not held for
profit, but restricted to low-income groups and (2) the project materially contributed to the morals, safety, and general welfare of the
municipality. On the basis of this test the court has continued to
exempt the property of similar housing authorities. 40 Nonetheless,
the property must comply with both elements of the test. In Adams
v. Housing Authority of Daytona Beach' 41 a housing authority had
been established with the authority to lease land to commercial and
135. City of Lakeland v. Amos, 106 Fla. 873, 143 So. 744, 747 (1932).
136. State v. City of Tallahassee, 142 Fla. 476, 195 So. 402, 403 (1940).
137. 145 Fla. 605, 200 So. 100 (1941).
138. 145 Fla. 605, id. at 102.
139. Fla. Laws 1937, ch. 17981.
140. See Garrett v. Northwest Fla. Regional Housing Authority, 152 Fla. 551,
12 So. 2d 448 (1943); Smith v. Housing Authority of Daytona Beach, 148 Fla. 195,
3 So. 2d 880 (1942); State ex rel. Grubstein v. Campbell, 146 Fla. 532, 1 So. 2d 483

(1941).
141.

60 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952).
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industrial concerns. The court regarded this as a violation of the
first element of the test, that is, the land was used for profit and not
restricted to low-income groups.
The liberal interpretation of public purpose was soon extended
beyond housing projects to the field of public utilities. In Saunders v.
City of Jacksonville-2 the municipality sought to enjoin Clay County
from collecting property taxes on electrical equipment used by the
city utility system. The property involved was outside the city limits.
The county contended that since power was sold to both residents and
nonresidents of the city, the land was not held and used for an exclusively municipal purpose. In effect, the county was attempting to
limit municipal purpose to those functions that benefit only the resi1 43
dents of the municipality. The court, however, held:
The exemption inures to the property itself when held and
used for municipal purposes. The Constitution makes no requirement as to its location. If the property serves a municipal
purpose to the residents within Jacksonville, then it likewise
serves a municipal purpose to the residents outside of Jacksonville. Its character does not change when the power line
traverses the city or county line.
The court distinguished City of Lakeland v. Amos1 4 on two
grounds: (1) that the earlier case concerned excise taxes on utility
revenues, not real property taxes, and (2) that municipal purpose was
no longer restricted to strictly governmental functions. "[W]here the
claim for exemption [is] dependent upon the property being used for
a public purpose, it [is] not essential that it be shown to be used as
a governmental purpose .... [T]he exemption [attaches] if the property [is] held and used for the health, comfort and welfare of the
public."''
This was basically a restatement of one of the elements of
the test for public purpose developed in State ex rel. Harper v.
McDavid.1 46 The court did not, however, carry over the other element
of the test: that the land be used for non-profitmaking purposes.
Further, the court has continued to grant exemptions to municipally
owned utilities regardless that the system was operated for profit.147
The Florida court has applied an identical approach to municipally owned and operated recreational facilities.48 Such facilities
142.
143.
144.
utilities
145.
146.
147.
148.

157 Fla. 240, 25 So. 2d 648 (1946).
157 Fla. 240, id. at 650.
106 Fla. 873, 143 So. 744 (1932) (holding that the operation of a public
system was proprietary, not governmental, in character).
Saunders v. City of Jacksonville, 157 Fla. 240, 25 So. 2d 648, 651 (1946).
145 Fla. 605, 200 So. 100, 102 (1941).
See Gwin v. City of Tallahassee, 132 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1961).
See, e.g., State v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist.,
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were regarded as contributing significantly to the general welfare in
that they provided a leisure outlet for the community and promoted
tourism.149 The presence of this contribution to the general welfare
was sufficient to establish a public purpose irrespective whether part
of the land was used for profitmaking pursuits. 50 Under such circumstances the profitmaking purpose was not viewed as objectionable as long as it remained "incidental" to the public purpose on
which the exemption was founded.
"IncidentalProfit"
By the late 1940's the "public purpose" concept had gone through
a three-stage evolution:
(1) land held and used for a public purpose was originally
restricted to public land employed in a strictly governmental
capacity; 151
(2) land held and used for a public purpose was then expanded to include non-profitmaking functions on public land
that materially contributed to the general welfare;1

52

and

(3) finally, land held and used for a public purpose was interpreted to mean any function performed on public land that
1
contributed to the general welfare.

53

In its third and present stage of development a public function may
be profitmaking,15 or non-profitmaking, 155 in nature. The fact that
the operation of the function results in profit to the municipality,156
or to a private concern, 57 does not prevent an exemption so long as
the profit is incidental to the public purpose.
The use of the term "incidental" would seem to imply a balancing
test in this area. How much of the property involved is held for
89 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1956); State v. Inter-American Center Authority, 84 So. 2d 9
(Fla. 1955); State v. Escambia County, 52 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1951).
149. State v. Inter-American Center Authority, supra note 148, at 12-14.
150. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist. v. Paul, 179 So. 2d
349, 354 (Fla. 1965); Panama City v. State, 93 So. 2d 608, 612-14 (Fla. 1957).
151. As is illustrated by City of Lakeland v. Amos, 106 Fla. 873, 143 So. 744, 747
(1932).
152. As is illustrated by State ex rel. Harper v. McDavid, 145 Fla. 605, 200
So. 100, 102 (1941).
153. As is illustrated in cases cited note 148 supra.
154. See State v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist., 89
So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1956).
155. See State v. Inter-American Center Authority, 84 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1955).
156. See State v. City of Miami, 76 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1954) (international trade
"mart" owned by the city).
157. See State v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist., 89
So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1956) (public speedway leased by a private corporation).
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profit? Does the private benefit outweigh the public purpose? An
analysis of the decisions indicates, however, that the court does not
in fact apply a balancing approach. In State v. Town of North
Miami 158 the municipality attempted to issue bonds for the purpose
of constructing industrial facilities. The facilities were then to be
leased to a private profitmaking corporation. The court held that
the construction of commercial or industrial facilities was not a
valid municipal purpose. It reasoned that: 159
Every new business, manufacturing plant, or industrial plant
which may be established in a municipality will be of some
benefit to the municipality. A new super market, a new department store, a new meat market, a steel mill, a crate manufacturing plant, a pulp mill, or other establishments which
could be named without end, may be of material benefit to
the growth, progress, development and prosperity of a municipality. But these considerations do not make the acquisition
of land and the erection of buildings, for such purposes, a municipal purpose.
The court, however, has been willing to find a public purpose
when a private profitmaking corporation operates a recreational
facility on public land. In State v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities District16° bonds were issued for the purpose of constructing the Daytona Beach International Automobile Speedway.
The speedway was to be leased to a private profitmaking corporation
for a period of at least six months per year. The court dismissed
cases such as Adams v. Housing Authority of Daytona Beach'6' and
State v. Town of North Miamil6 2 by reasoning that: "[T]hese cases
involved attempts of the city to use public funds to develop property
for private benefit .... In each of these cases the private purpose was

predominant, not incidental to a public purpose."' 6 3 What made the
private purpose predominant in Town of North Miami and only incidental in Daytona Beach Racing? One possible distinction is that
the industrial corporation was to have exclusive use of the land in
the former case while in the latter the municipality had the right to
use the land when the speedway was not in operation. The court,
however, did not choose to rely on this distinction. The public purpose involved encompassed more than occasional use of the facilities
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

59 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1952).
Id. at 784-85. (Emphasis added.)
89 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1956).
60 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952).
59 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1952).
State v. Daytona Beach Racing 9- Recreational Facilities Dist., 89 So. 2d

34, 36 (Fla. 1956).
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for nonprofit recreational activities. The community-wide economic
benefits derived from the operation of the speedway per se were regarded as the public purpose justifying the issuance of bonds. The
implication is that even if the municipality had no right to use the
facility, the project still would have been for a valid public purpose.
The above implication would seem to result in a clear conflict
between Daytona Beach Racing and Town of North Miami. If the
profits from the exclusive operation of a recreational facility are
"incidental" to the public purpose, the profits from operation of an
industrial complex should also be "incidental" to the communitywide economic benefits derived therefrom. 64 The only answer to
the seeming paradox is that these decisions are not in fact based on
the incidental profit rationale. The rationale is no more than a label
whereby the court may sustain a profitmaking project, if in the
judgment of the court, it is for a valid public purpose.
When the purpose of the project is recreational,the project may
be operated in part 65 or exclusivelyr 66 for profit without the loss of
its nature as a public purpose. The court does not, however, regard
the construction of industrial or manufacturing facilities as a proper
6
public purpose. In State v. Clay County Development Authority' 7
an attempt was made to issue bonds for the purpose of constructing an
industrial plant to be leased to a private corporation. The plant was
to be placed on a small portion of the land held by the authority.
The remainder of the land was being used for public recreational
facilities. These facts were closely related to those that occurred in
Panama City v. State 6s when the municipality issued bonds to construct a recreational area with a small portion of the land being rented
to private profitmaking concerns. The distinction was that the private
concerns in Panama City were food and concession stands, which contributed to the over-all recreational purpose of the land. On the other
hand, the purpose of the profitmaking firm in Clay County Development Authority was basically unrelated to the function of the re69
mainder of the land as a recreational area:
The dominant and paramount purpose is to lend the credit of
the county to a private corporation . . . . The only possible
public purpose which it serves is to promote the general development of the area by furnishing employment to the resi164. See Justice Terrell's dissent in State v. Suwannee County Dev. Authority,
122 So. 2d 190, 194 (Fla. 1960).
165. Panama City v. State, 93 So. 2d 608, 612-14 (Fla. 1957).
166. See State v. City of Miami, 76 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1954).
167. 140 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1962).
168. 93 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1957).
169. State v. Clay County Dev. Authority, 140 So. 2d 576, 580 (Fla. 1962).
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If we approve the issuance of bonds

by the public authorities of this state to build and finance
private enterprises ...

in order to alleviate unemployment and

to promote the economic development of the area, then there
is no limit to the extent to which the credit of the State and its
authorities may be extended to private interests.
To justify government financing of industrial development more must
be shown than that such development will contribute to the general
economic welfare. The purpose of the project must be related to
some recognized public purpose - recreational facilities, 17° education,

1

traffic1

72

or transportation control,173 et cetera.

From Confusion to Clarity
Cases such as Clay County Development Authority have restricted
the public purpose concept. The implication in the tax exemption
area is that a profitmaking concern on public land may obtain an
exemption only if its purpose is related to some recognized public
purpose.17 4 But does sound tax policy ever justify a real property
tax exemption in favor of a profitmaking operation? The basic assumption behind real property taxation is that property may be
taxed by the state since it is the state that protects those rights and
privileges incident to ownership. "1 5 The basic policy behind tax
exemptions is that certain land uses are of such benefit to the state
that a special tax privilege is justified." 76 When a nonprofit corporation operates a public function, it benefits the state.177 Further,
this benefit is conferred without corresponding private profit to the
corporation. Considering the absence of a profit incentive, the
purpose of the corporation seems essentially public in nature.
A profitmaking corporation, on the other hand, derives private
benefit when it undertakes the operation of a public function. Al170. See Hanna v. Sunrise Recreation, Inc., 94 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1957); Panama
City v. State, 93 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1957).
171. See State v. Board of Control, 66 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1953).
172. See Gate City Garage, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 66 So. 2d 653 (Fla.
1953).
173. See Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Peters, 43 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1949).
174. A comparison of State v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist., 89 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1956), with Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational
Facilities Dist. v. Paul, 179 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1965) illustrates how easily the public
purpose justifying the issuance of bonds is carried over into the tax exemption
context.
175.

SLY,

TAx AssET'S AND TAX POLICIES IN FLORIDA 9 (1964).

176. See case cited note 51 supra.
177. Miller v. Doss, 46 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. 1950).
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though a change in corporate label does not affect the use of the
landys8 it does seem to alter the basic purpose of the corporation.
Why does a profit corporation undertake to operate a public function? Realistically speaking, it is absurd to state that its motives are
primarily altruistic. Franchises to operate public facilities are sought
because they are a sure investment. A concession at a beach or sports
arena is a valuable economic right. Is not this economic benefit,
conferred by the state, sufficient compensation without the "iceing"
of preferential tax treatment?
The 1961 report of the Florida Joint Legislative Committee on
Finance and Taxation was in apparent agreement with the tax policy
discussed above.Y79 The committee recommended a series of amendments to the exemptions under Florida Statutes, chapter 192. The
report states: "The primary purpose of the amendments is to require
persons now exempt from taxation who engage in profit making enterprise not contemplated by the Florida Constitution to share in the
cost of providing governmental services."' 8 0 In line with this policy
statement the committee suggested that chapter 192 be amended by
adding a new section to the effect that:18 '
(1) Any real or personal property which for any reason is
exempt or immune from taxation but is being used, occupied,
owned, controlled or possessed, directly or indirectly by a person, firm, corporation, partnership or other organization in connection with a profit making venture, whether such use, occupation, ownership, control or possession is by lease, loan, contract of sale, option to purchase or in any wise made available
to or used by such person, firm, corporation, partnership or
organization, shall be assessed and taxed to the same extent
and in the same manner as other real or personal property.
(2) This section shall not apply to property described in
subsection (1) when:
the property is used exclusively for religious, scientific,
municipal, educational, literary or charitable purposes .. . .
The suggested amendment was apparently designed to eliminate
tax exemptions on land held by profitmaking organizations. The only
exception was for land devoted exclusively to the purposes enumerated in subsection two. The suggested amendment was adopted

178.
179.
Interim
180.
181.

Rogers v. City of Leesburg, 157 Fla. 784, 27 So. 2d 70, 71 (1946).
See generally Report and Recommendations of the Joint Legislative
Committee on Finance and Taxation 39-43 (1959-1961).
Id. at 41.
Id. at 42. (Emphasis added.)
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verbatim by the 1961 legislature.1's - The legislature, however, added
a proviso exempting property: 183
[O]wned or used by the state, any county, municipality, or
public entity or authority created by statute and . . . leased

or otherwise made available to such person, firm, corporation,
partnership or organization . . . in the performance by the

public body of a public function or public purpose authorized
by law ....

Although the court has not had occasion to rule on the above
provisions, they do not seem to have changed the law substantially.
The "exclusive use" requirement is left open to judicial construction,
and there is precedent holding that this requirement does not
necessarily exclude profit-producing property that is otherwise exempt. 8 4 The exclusive use requirement would have been more
meaningful if the legislature had adopted another proposal of the
committee:185
Definition of exclusive use -The term "exclusive use" or
"exclusively" whenever used in connection with, or describing
any exemption under this chapter, is interpreted to render inoperative the exemption for any use of property which is not
fully, completely, and specifically for the exempt purpose. Any
deviation from this definition will not qualify that proportionate part of the subject property otherwise used to the exemption.
In the absence of a provision such as this, or a strengthened judicial interpretation, "exclusive use" will continue to be the same
vague concept that has confused Florida tax law for years.
By enacting subsection (2) (c) to Florida Statutes, section 192.62,
the legislature apparently sought to codify the present judicial interpretation of the public purpose exemption. The subsection permits
exemptions for profitmaking use of public land so long as that use
is related to a valid public purpose. Such a provision operates as a
substantial qualification on both the underlying policy and the desired effect of the committee's original proposal. The provision leaves
182. FLA. STAT. §192.62 (1), (2) (a) (1965).
183. FLA. STAT. § 192.62 (2) (c) (1965). (Emphasis added.)
184. See Lummus v. Florida Adirondack School, Inc., 123 Fla. 810, 168 So. 232,
240 (1936). The Florida Adirondack case was brought under the exclusive use requirement of article XVI, §16, and it is possible that the court could attach a
more rigid definition to a specific legislative requirement of exclusive use. Nonetheless, the other exceptions under FLA. STAT. §192.62 (1965) are so pervasive as
to make such an interpretation unlikely.
185. Report and Recommendations, supra note 179, at 42. (Emphasis added.)
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a loophole in section 192.62 whereby the profitmaking corporation can
escape paying its share in the cost of government services.
The Florida Supreme Court, however, may have decided to adopt
a judicial solution to the problem. In Brandes v. City of Deerfield
BeachsG the municipality issued bonds for the purpose of constructing
a baseball stadium. The facilities were to be leased to a private corporation, which would then rent the park to the Pittsburgh Pirates
during the spring training season. During the remainder of the year
the park was to be rented to minor league teams. The court held
that the project was not a valid public purpose.
As was pointed out by the dissent, the case represents a clear
departure from precedent such as State v. Daytona Beach Racing &
Recreational FacilitiesDistrict.187 The over-all purpose of the sports
complex was recreational in nature, contributing to the communitywide welfare. As such it seems to meet the Daytona Beach Racing
test for public purpose. Although it is too early to make an accurate
assessment of Deerfield, it is possible that the case represents an
abandonment of the tax policy announced in Daytona Beach Racing.
In the future the rule may be that the private operation of a public
function may be considered exempt only when that private operation
is of a nonprofit nature. If and when that day comes, the court will
be able to say with honesty that the tax policy of Florida is consistent
with the principle:
All exemptions being in the nature of special privileges or
immunities, must be construed strictly in favor of the Sovereign
in order to confine such exemptions to the limitations prescribed by said Sovereign; otherwise the law-making intent
and the very purpose of government itself may be frustrated
to the detriment of the public welfare and the common weal.
-Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla.
718, 192 So. 211, 216 (1939).
WILLrAM

D.

GODDARD

JOHN C. SPENCER

186.
187.

186 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1966).
89 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1957).
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